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Exploring bank-level data from a small open economy, we present evidence that global funding 
conditions limit the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy in terms of shaping both the volume 
and the riskiness of bank lending. We show that more favorable global funding conditions 
associated with a local currency appreciation encourage banks to increase lending, leverage up, 
take more risks, and thus insulate themselves from lean-against-the-wind domestic monetary 
policy. These results support the existence of a risk-taking channel of currency appreciation (Bruno 
and Shin (2015a, b)) at the bank level. 
 
I. Introduction 
How does bank lending react to monetary policy in the presence of global financial flows? 
As the so-called “bank lending channel” in conventional wisdom states, tightening domestic 
monetary policy raises banks’ funding costs in the domestic money market, which leads to a 
contraction in banks’ credit supply, and vice versa (see, for example, Kashyap and Stein (2000)). 
However, if banks actively fund themselves in international money markets, the traditional bank 
lending channel may be less effective, or even break down, as is shown in the seminal research of 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012). Further, a vast and growing literature has shown that, in the 
presence of cross-border capital flows, foreign interest rates affect funding costs for domestic 
banks, so that domestic lending volumes are subject to spillovers from core economies’ monetary 
policy (see Morais, Peydró, and Ruiz (2019), Baskaya, di Giovanni, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Ulu 




Bank-level empirical studies documenting these spillover effects, however, ignore the 
impact of exchange rate dynamics in shaping the externalities of foreign monetary policy. Bruno 
and Shin (2015a) illustrate that this is not an innocuous omission, since exchange rate dynamics 
interact with foreign monetary policy in shaping the dynamics of local credit. In their model, 
borrowers face a currency mismatch by borrowing in dollars whilst most of their revenues are 
denominated in local currency, so any appreciation of the domestic currency is associated with a 
drop in borrowers’ risk at least in the short term. Since banks have to put less capital aside for 
loans with lower perceived risk, they can increase their leverage and expand their lending volumes. 
This leads to further inflow of cross-border capital and an appreciation of the currency. A 
tightening of a core economy’s monetary policy can reverse this positive loop: The depreciation 
of the local currency leads to an upward shift in borrowers’ risk and requires deleveraging 
associated with a drop in lending volumes. Since risks build during the positive stage of the loop 
and the increase in lending volumes is also associated with a risk shift, Bruno and Shin (2015a) 
therefore term such dynamics “the risk-taking channel of currency appreciation”. While these 
authors present a thorough test of their predictions at the country-level, the bank-level validity of 
the presumed channels has not been empirically established so far. 
In this paper, we fill this gap by illustrating how global funding conditions that are related 
to exchange rate dynamics and arise from global risk factors as well as core economies’ monetary 
policy affect the transmission of domestic monetary policy both in terms of loan volumes and 
portfolio risk. For this purpose, we employ detailed bank financial reports for all banks in a small 
open economy, Norway, over more than 20 years. Although we take Norway as a laboratory for 
identification, we believe that our findings are applicable for other small open economies, too, as 
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is documented by Bruno and Shin (2015b) and Avdjiev, Du, Koch, and Shin (2019) based on 
macro-level data.  
We start by demonstrating that while domestic monetary policy was reasonably effective 
before 2001—which was the year when the Norges Bank abandoned formal exchange rate 
interventions and de facto enabled deviations from interest rate parity—after this date the classic 
lending channel loses its effectiveness in Norway. For this purpose, we estimate a classic lending 
channel model (Kashyap and Stein (2000) as modified by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012)) that 
identifies the impact of policy rates on the supply of bank loans by focusing on how policy rates 
shape the sensitivity of bank lending volumes to the ex ante liquidity endowment of the banks. We 
also show that the reduced effectiveness of domestic monetary policy is particularly pronounced 
in times of domestic policy rate tightening, when the “leaning-against-the-wind” policy fails to 
achieve the intended reduction in lending volumes. Next, we conjecture that the failure to 
document a classic bank lending channel for Norway after 2001 is due to the omission of potential 
changes in funding costs for Norwegian banks in international money markets. To overcome this 
omission, we integrate global funding conditions as shaped by the interaction between foreign 
monetary policy and exchange rate dynamics into the empirical model. For this purpose, we 
include the deviation from uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) as an additional covariate in the 
classic lending channel model. Since this deviation approximates the component of international 
funding costs that is not driven by domestic monetary policy, it provides us with a measure of the 
cost advantage of foreign currency funding determined by exchange rate dynamics. While Bruno 
and Shin (2015a) explicitly allow for the exchange rate to be endogenous with regard to capital 
flows and bank lending, we focus on a microeconometric identification strategy based on 
extracting the exogenous component of UIP deviations, using an instrumental variable technique. 
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In constructing the instruments, we elaborate on the role of the oil price as well as global risk 
factors such as the VIX and the broad dollar index, so that at this step we particularly benefit from 
the choice of Norway as a “laboratory”. We also control for the fact that some foreign currency 
positions are hedged and show that the results of our estimation are robust to using deviations from 
covered (instead of uncovered) interest rate parities as a proxy for the impact of the cost advantage 
of foreign currency funding on bank lending. 
We then explore the channels through which international funding affects Norwegian 
banks’ lending. We find that the impact of international funding costs is asymmetric. When these 
costs are favorable, they significantly shape bank lending and reduce the effectiveness of domestic 
monetary policy.  In turn, when international funding costs rise, domestic monetary policy 
significantly affects bank lending. That is, banks actively arbitrage between global and domestic 
funding, depending on which cost is more favorable. Zooming into the result that favorable global 
funding conditions actively shape bank lending in Norway, we show that the use of foreign 
currency liabilities by Norwegian banks increases when the costs of foreign currency funding 
decrease.  
After establishing how global banking affects the volume of domestic bank lending, we 
further explore its influence on banks’ risk-taking behavior. We test the model of Bruno and Shin 
(2015a) by tracing how the portfolio of bank loans depends on global funding conditions. 
Consistent with the predictions of their model, we find that the lending expansion following the 
currency appreciation is associated with increased bank leverage. The appreciation leads to a 
higher share of commercial and industrial loans and a lower share of mortgage loans, as well as to 
an increase in non-performing loans, suggesting that we observe not only a shift in the volume but 
also the riskiness of bank lending. Since we also observe that capital levels do not rise at the 
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individual bank level, we can assert, consistent with Bruno and Shin (2015a), that banks justify 
the expansion of loans that generally require higher capital weights by reducing the perceived 
riskiness of their balance sheets. 
Our analysis contributes to several strands of the literature. Our main contribution is to 
provide the first microeconometric, bank-level evidence on the risk-taking channel of currency 
appreciation, as proposed by Bruno and Shin (2015a). This evidence highlights the role of 
international spillovers of monetary policy and illustrates the need to account for currency 
exchange dynamics, when exploring the interactions between domestic and foreign monetary 
policy. In a more general sense, by showing that the dynamics of exchange rates and global risk 
aversion affect domestic lending, our findings echo recent concerns about the rising contribution 
of international financial factors to domestic credit cycles. Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) find 
that a sharp appreciation of the local currency is a reliable indicator of lending booms and 
subsequent financial crises. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) argue that the procyclical nature of cross-
border bank-intermediated credit flows has given rise to serious economic and financial 
instabilities. Avdjiev, McCauley, and Shin (2015) criticize the “triple coincidence” assumption in 
the conventional paradigm for monetary economics, i.e., that the GDP boundary coincides with 
the monetary policy decision-making unit and currency area, for neglecting the effects of 
international currencies on domestic financial stability. Using aggregate data, Rey (2015) finds 
that US monetary policy affects the leverage of global banks, which leads to co-movements of 
global asset prices, cross-border capital flows, and credit growth in the international financial 
system. This result is termed an “irreconcilable duo” —independent monetary policy is only 
possible if and only if the capital account is managed.  
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By showing the close link between foreign currency funding costs for Norwegian banks 
and global risk factors, such as the VIX and the broad dollar currency exchange index, we 
contribute to the literature relating capital flows to global risk factors. Our bank-level evidence on 
how these risk factors affect bank leverage supports the insights that both the VIX (Rey (2015)) 
and later the broad dollar index (Avdjiev et al. (2019), Bruno and Shin (2020), and Erik, Lombardi, 
Mihaljek, and Shin (2020)) interfere with real economic dynamics by shaping bank leverage. We 
also show that these relationships persist even when foreign currency positions are hedged. This 
is consistent with Bräuning and Ivashina’s (2020) findings that even with hedged positions, bank 
lending is still subject to spillover effects that are caused by the shift in credit supply in hedging 
transactions. Avdjiev et al. (2019) similarly show that cross-border spillovers are related to 
deviations from covered interest rate parity. 
 By showing that the existence of a global funding channel makes domestic monetary policy 
less effective, especially when the central bank wants to tighten monetary policy and restrain a 
domestic credit boom, our analysis also illustrates a major channel that hampers lean against the 
wind monetary policies (Gourio, Kashyap, and Sim (2018), Schularick, ter Steege, and Ward 
(2020)), in particular in small open economies. This needs to be addressed when macroprudential 
policies are designed in order to contain excessive volatilities over credit cycles. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section II, we describe the institutional 
framework and the data. In Section III, we replicate the approach of classic lending channel studies 
for the case of Norway and illustrate the failure of the traditional lending channel. We go on to 
explore the effect of global factors measured by the cost advantage of foreign currency funding 
and show that this is a driving force in bank lending. In Section IV, we illustrate the shifts in bank 
assets and liabilities associated with the changes in foreign currency funding costs. Robustness 
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checks are carried out in Section V. In Section VI, we discuss the policy implications of our 
findings and conclude. 
II. Institutional Framework and Data  
A. Norwegian Banking Sector: A Brief Introduction 
As of 2017Q4, there are 100 savings banks and 36 commercial banks in Norway. Of the 
commercial banks, 12 are foreign-owned, including six subsidiaries and six branches. 1  The 
commercial banks are limited liability companies. The foreign-owned commercial banks are 
mostly either subsidiaries or branches of Swedish, Finnish, and Danish banks. The savings banks 
(“sparebank”) were established by Norwegian municipalities as independent entities without 
external owners, taking deposits and providing credit to local households and regional businesses.  
What is new and noteworthy in the Norwegian banking sector are the mortgage companies 
(“kredittforetak”), currently 33 in total as of 2017Q4. These companies are subsidiaries of some 
of the commercial and savings banks, were established after a legal change in 2007, and specialize 
in issuing covered bonds backed by domestic (over 95% are residential) mortgage loans. As of 
2017Q4, total covered bonds outstanding in Norway amounted to EUR 115.183 billion (roughly 
15% of total assets in the Norwegian banking sector, or 33% of Norwegian GDP). About 60% of 
the volume of covered bonds was denominated in foreign currencies. 2  Since a mortgage 
company’s main function is issuing covered bonds to fund the mortgage business of its parent 
                                                          
1 See Norges Bank Historical Monetary Statistics, available on http://www.norges-bank.no/en/Statistics/Historical-
monetary-statistics/Money-credit-and-banking/, and the Norwegian Savings Banks Association 
(“Sparebankforeningen”), available on http://www.sparebankforeningen.no, with our own update. 
2 Our own calculation, based on Finance Norway statistics, available on https://www.fno.no/en/. 
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bank, we do not consider mortgage companies as separate entities in our estimations but rather 
match their foreign currency-denominated liabilities to those of their parent banks.3  
B. Monetary Policy Regimes and Bank Funding Costs  
Stabilizing the Norwegian krone exchange rate was one of the monetary authorities’ major 
concerns throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Monetary policy was then characterized by the central 
bank’s frequent active intervention in the foreign exchange market to maintain a managed floating 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the currencies of major trading-partner countries.4 In a move towards a 
flexible inflation targeting regime, Norges Bank stopped intervening in the foreign exchange 
market in January 1999.5 The introduction of inflation targeting6 was officially formalized in 2001.  
Like banks in other open economies, Norwegian banks raise funding from both the 
domestic money market in domestic currency (NOK) and the international money market in 
foreign currencies. Most of the loans issued by Norwegian banks (88% in 2017) are, however, 
issued in domestic currency. Domestic monetary policy creates a wedge between the domestic 
                                                          
3 All empirical results presented in this paper are robust to the use of bank balance sheets without including banks’ 
mortgage companies. 
4  “Two years with inflation targeting in Norway and Iceland”, Danmarks Nationalbank, 2003, available on 
http://www.nationalbanken.dk/en/publications/Documents/2003/06/2003_MON2_two73.pdf. 
5 See “Monetary Policy in Norway”, Norges Bank, available on http://www.norges-bank.no/en/about/Mandate-and-
core-responsibilities/Monetary-policy-in-Norway/. It has been emphasized that “… exchange market intervention, 
irrespective of whether currency is bought or sold, is not an appropriate instrument for influencing the krone over a 
longer period.” 




money market rate and the international money market rate. Whether or not this wedge results in 
different funding costs when using domestic currency funding from those when using foreign 
currency funding depends on whether the exchange rate between NOK and foreign currencies 
changes so that the wedge is neutralized. If the exchange rate dynamics are consistent with UIP, 
the costs of foreign currency funding will be approximately the same as those of funding 
denominated in domestic currency. When exchange rate stabilization was the monetary policy 
regime, the domestic key policy rate and exchange market interventions were designed to eliminate 
arbitrage opportunities in the foreign exchange (FX) market.7 As a result, even if a bank exploits 
the interest rate differential when the domestic money market rate is higher than the international 
rate and borrows in foreign currency, once it converts FX funding to NOK for domestic lending, 
the dynamics in the NOK exchange rate will fully neutralize the interest rate differential. In other 
words, under the exchange rate stabilization regime, domestic monetary policy is, in theory, fully 
effective in changing banks’ funding costs, independent of their funding currencies, and there is 
no cost advantage of FX funding. 
However, such effectiveness may have been eroded when exchange rate stabilization was 
abandoned after the regime change. Without the central bank’s active intervention in the FX 
market, the NOK exchange rate was free to float and subject to the influence of global factors, 
such as global risk aversion, that are beyond the reach of the central bank in a small open economy, 
so that interest rate parities may not hold anymore. This may lead to a cost advantage of certain 
                                                          
7 For example, given the spot NOK exchange rate 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 and foreign interest rate 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗, to stabilize the future spot NOK 
exchange rate 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1, the domestic interest rate 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 shall be set as 1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗), which is exactly uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP). 
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funding currencies: suppose funding costs are lower for FX funding, then a tighter domestic 
monetary policy that only increases the domestic money market interest rate will encourage banks 
to take cheaper FX funding so that they do not necessarily have to cut domestic lending—as is 
suggested by the conventional bank lending channel. The effectiveness of domestic monetary 
policy in driving bank lending is thus reduced. 
C. Data Description 
Our data employs the monthly ORBOF8 reports (Report 10 and Report 11) submitted in 
the period between January 1994 and December 2017, which register the components of balance 
sheets and income statements for all Norwegian banks —including commercial banks, savings 
banks, subsidiaries of foreign banks, branches of foreign banks and bank-affiliated mortgage 
companies. Since we aim at a consistent comparison with other lending channel empirical studies, 
which are frequently based on quarterly data, we use the respective end-of-quarter monthly report. 
The quarterly frequency also allows us a better match with the macroeconomic variables; further, 
it reduces the noise associated with very frequent loan volume observations.  
Even though the data is available for earlier periods, we choose 1994Q1 as a starting point 
to avoid dealing with the substantial structural transformation of the Norwegian banking landscape 
during the 1988-1993 Nordic banking crisis, when numerous banks went bankrupt or were 
nationalized. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 185 banks.  
We match the bank-level data to macroeconomic aggregate level variables such as GDP, 
real estate prices (which, as already mentioned, are mostly available with a quarterly frequency), 
                                                          




as well as a battery of domestic and international monetary policy and money market interest rates. 
The domestic interest rates are drawn from Norges Bank’s monetary statistics, while the 
international interest rates are from the St. Louis Fed’s FRED databank. We combine these data 
with dataset information for the broad dollar index and for the levels and dynamics of the 
Norwegian krone exchange rates relative to major foreign currencies.   
D. The Norwegian Banking Sector as a Suitable Laboratory 
The Norwegian bank-level data is unique in that it provides information about the currency 
denomination, distinguishing between the domestic currency and foreign currencies, for all the 
categories reported in the balance sheet as well as for most of the profit and loss account items 
over a considerably long time horizon. This information allows us to track with a very high level 
of precision the dynamics of foreign currency assets and liabilities for the periods with different 
monetary policy regimes and global funding conditions. This is of crucial importance for the 
micro-level examination of how the effectiveness of monetary policy is modified by the currency 
composition of bank assets and liabilities. The Norwegian banking sector is an ideal laboratory for 
studying the interactions between domestic monetary policy and global financial factors. First, 
Norwegian banks have the opportunity to explore global factor dynamics, since many of them have 
sufficient access to international funding sources. The share of foreign currency-denominated 
liabilities soared from about 10% of total bank liabilities in the mid-1990s to more than a quarter 
of total bank funding in 2017.9 The speed of foreign currency funding growth has been particularly 
high in the post-2001 period. The fact that the Norwegian krone market is highly liquid ensures 
that banks are able to access the FX market with rather low transaction costs. A second major 
                                                          
9 Including foreign currency funding via bank-affiliated mortgage companies. 
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advantage of the Norwegian data is that it allows us to employ global risk attitudes as instrumental 
variables for exchange rate fluctuations and thus achieve convincing identification. To add further 
strength to the identification, we also take advantage of the fact that the oil price is a strong 
exogenous determinant of NOK exchange rates, so that we can derive some exogenous 
components of the costs of funding in foreign currency using oil price as an additional instrument. 
Third, the Norwegian example allows us to explore the role of global factors for bank lending in a 
high-income economy with free capital movement and very strong institutions, including strict 
bank regulation that requires banks to hedge a substantial share of their foreign currency positions. 
This advantage is particularly important given that most of the debates on the effect of global 
factors on local lending have so far focused on emerging periphery economies, where weak 
banking regulation and fragile institutions prevail. In addition, the Norwegian banking sector was 
not substantially affected by the 2007-2009 global financial crisis and 2012 European debt crisis: 
Monetary policy did not reach the zero lower bound and no quantitative easing was carried out, so 
that there is less concern about the impact of unconventional domestic monetary policy in our 
sample. 
III. Global Financial Flows and Monetary Policy Transmission 
A. Lending as a Function of Domestic and Global Funding Conditions  
In this section, we examine how domestic monetary policy and global funding conditions 
jointly determine the dynamics of bank lending supply. Our point of departure is a standard 
empirical estimation of the effectiveness of the domestic bank lending channel, as proposed by 
Kashyap and Stein (2000), later modified by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012). In the framework of 
these studies, a tightening of monetary policy represents a funding shock for banks, which they 
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cannot fully offset by issuing alternative liabilities. The shock is therefore transmitted to the asset 
side of the bank balance sheet. As a result, the monetary policy shock affects the supply of bank 
lending.  
In econometric terms, the identification of the supply-driven effects of monetary policy on 
observable bank lending volumes is achieved by assuming that a bank’s lending supply will react 
less to funding shocks if the bank has a high ex ante endowment of liquid assets, since banks can 
liquidate these assets to cushion the funding shock instead of cutting lending. The supply side of 
lending dynamics is, therefore, more sensitive to banks’ ex ante liquidity endowment when 
monetary policy is tight. More specifically, the empirical estimation is based on a two-stage 
procedure (Kashyap and Stein (2000), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012)). 
The first stage is described in equation (1): 
(1) LOAN_GROWTH𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡,𝑗𝑗LOAN_GROWTH𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗4𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡CONTROLS𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡   
in which LOAN_GROWTH𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the growth rate of total loans and leases of bank 𝑖𝑖 in quarter 𝑡𝑡. The 
liquidity measure of bank 𝑖𝑖, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, is defined as the logarithm of the ratio of a bank’s liquid assets 
to total assets, ln�LIQUID_ASSETS_TO_ASSETS𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1�. Following Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012), 
we address a potential identification issue related to the fact that bank liquid asset holdings may 
react to macroeconomic conditions. We do this by instrumenting observable liquid assets using 
the residual of a regression of liquid-assets-to-total asset ratio on the ratio of commercial and 
industrial (C&I) lending to total lending and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.10 The 
vector CONTROLS𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 includes bank-specific control variables such as the bank’s capitalization 
                                                          
10 In unreported tests, we also show that results are robust to using the observable values of liquid assets to total assets 
without employing instrumental variable techniques. 
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ratio, its total assets, deposit growth rate, the type of bank (savings bank or foreign bank subsidiary), 
the share of liabilities denominated in foreign currency, as well as the amount of write-offs relative 
to total assets. CONTROLS𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 also includes a vector of macro-level control variables, such as the 
GDP growth rate and the growth rate of house prices, to capture the impacts of business cycles. A 
full list of all variables used throughout the empirical analyses and their definition is presented in 
Table 1.11  To avoid any simultaneity issues related to the fact that banks jointly determine asset 
and liability positions on their balance sheet, all control variables enter the regressions with one-
quarter lags. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the error term. 
We run the cross-sectional equation (1) quarter by quarter to generate a time series of the 
coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡, which represents the time-variant sensitivity of bank lending to the liquid assets of 
the bank. In the second stage, the relationship between the time series of 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 and monetary policy 
interest rates is examined based on the following equation (2): 
(2)  𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 
in which we regress 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 on monetary policy rates 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 in the preceding 𝑗𝑗 periods, with 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 being the 
error term. We proxy monetary policy rate 𝑟𝑟 by the Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR), 
and we also provide robustness checks by measuring 𝑟𝑟 by the key policy rate in Section V. Using 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), we define the number of quarters 𝑛𝑛 to be included in the 
                                                          
11 Results are qualitatively unchanged if we include controls for the type of bank (e.g. savings, commercial, or foreign) 
throughout all regression specifications. 
16 
 
series of lagged monetary policy rates as six.12 As in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012), we consider 
possible autocorrelation and correct standard errors using the Newey-West variance estimator.  
The definition and summary statistics of all variables included in both stages of the 
estimation are presented in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
As mentioned above, the conventional bank lending channel suggests that bank lending 
should become more sensitive to bank liquidity when monetary policy is tightened, and less so 
when monetary policy is loosened. In the framework of our estimation, this implies that the sum 
of the coefficients of monetary policy rates 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 should be positive and significant. 
The outcome of the two-step regression is reported in Table 2, in which we show the sum 
of the coefficients of the interest rate lags in terms of point estimate and statistical significance13, 
while the time series of the intermediate estimates of 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 are illustrated in Figure A1 in Appendix 
A. In column 1 of this table, we show the estimate when the model is run for the full sample period 
(1994-2017). In this case, the sum of the coefficients of the interest rates, ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 , is statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that the conventional transmission mechanism of monetary policy is not 
supported by our sample. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
                                                          
12  Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) set this number at eight. We have rerun all models using the eight-quarter 
specifications, and the results are qualitatively the same. 
13 The sum of the coefficients is computed using the lincom command in STATA. 
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 Next, we explore the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy for the period before and 
after the Norges Bank’s policy regime switch in 2001. The result in column 2 of Table 2 shows a 
positive and significant ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 , implying that prior to the policy shift in 2001 the conventional 
lending channel was effective. The fact that ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 is significantly negative for the later period (see 
column 3) suggests that domestic monetary policy transmission via the bank lending channel 
breaks down for the period of 2002-2017.14 
Furthermore, we find that the post-2001 breakdown is more pronounced when the central 
bank “leans against the wind”. As is shown in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2, when there is a positive 
change in NIBOR, i.e., when monetary policy becomes tighter (defined as a rise in NIBOR during 
the past 4 quarters, or, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−4 > 0), bank lending reacts to monetary policy in a way that is 
inconsistent with the existence of a lending channel, as ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 is negative. However, when there is a 
negative change in NIBOR, i.e. when monetary policy becomes looser (defined as 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−4 < 0), 
our estimation is consistent with the existence of a lending channel, as ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 is positive—although 
it is not statistically significant. Such asymmetry is in line with our conjecture in Section II.B that 
banks may arbitrage and shift funding towards cheaper FX funding in international money markets 
when tightening monetary policy increases the costs of domestic money market funding. As a 
result, banks can avoid the contraction in lending sought by the central bank. 
B. Cost Advantage, Global Factors, and the Foreign Funding Channel 
                                                          
14 In unreported tests, we also split the sample into different sub-periods in order to establish whether 2001 is indeed 
the year when the regime changed. We consistently find that for any periods prior to 2001, the conventional lending 




The breakdown of the bank lending channel in the period 2002-2017 is likely related to the 
Norges Bank’s regime switch. As we discussed in Section II.B, after Norges Bank stopped 
intervention in FX market, the NOK exchange rate was free to float and was subject to the 
influence of global factors, such as global risk aversion, so that interest rate parities may not hold 
anymore. This may lead to a cost advantage for certain currencies, incentivizing banks to arbitrage 
between domestic and international money markets, reducing the effectiveness of the bank lending 
channel in domestic monetary policy transmission. Of course, given the fact that substantial 
advances in information technology have also improved the international integration of financial 
markets, thus increasing the international exposures of banks not only in Norway but basically 
around the globe, we do not argue that the change in the monetary policy regime is the sole driving 
force of the shift in the lending channel’s effectiveness. We rather consider the abolition of foreign 
exchange interventions by the Norges Bank as the step that allows for a stronger effect of global 
factors on banks’ funding costs and domestic monetary policy transmission. 
In this section we explore how global funding conditions, which determine the costs of 
funding in foreign currency and therefore drive banks’ incentives to arbitrage between FX and 
domestic currency funding, interact with domestic monetary policy in shaping bank lending 
volumes. As discussed in Section II.B, we focus on the cost advantage of foreign currency funding 
that is given by the deviation from UIP. This costs advantage represents the interest rate differential 
between Norway and the core economy (in our baseline estimations, we focus on the US as a core, 
we later present robustness evidence using the euro area) that is orthogonal with regard to domestic 
monetary policy and contingent on exchange rate dynamics. We construct a simple measure of the 
cost advantage of US dollar funding, ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, corresponding to the deviation from the uncovered interest 
parity (UIP) defined in the following way: 
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(3)  ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 = IMPLIED_NOK/USD𝑡𝑡+1−NOK/USD𝑡𝑡+1NOK/USD𝑡𝑡   
in which NOK/USD𝑡𝑡+1 represents the observed NOK/USD exchange rate in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1, while 
the implied NOK/USD exchange rate is the exchange rate that can fully neutralize the interest rate 
differential (or, the exchange rate under which UIP holds). This implied NOK/USD exchange rate 
is calculated through 
(4)   IMPLIED_NOK/USD𝑡𝑡+1 =  NOK/USD𝑡𝑡 1+𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡1+𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗  
where 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ are interest rates in Norway and the US, respectively, measured by three-month 
NIBOR and the USD LIBOR rates.15 In this way, positive deviation ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 > 0 means that the actual 
NOK/USD exchange rate is below (i.e. the NOK is stronger) what is suggested by (4), implying a 
cost advantage of FX funding. 
In Figure 1, we present ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 over the entire horizon of our data sample. Indeed, prior to year 
2001, UIP deviations were smaller in magnitude and relatively short-lived, while they became 
increasingly persistent, especially in a positive direction, once Norges Bank switched its monetary 
policy regime to inflation targeting and ceased intervening in the FX market. As we will show 
later, the peaks of the ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 are mainly associated with oil price dynamics as well as with other global 
factors, such as global risk (as proxied by the VIX index and the broad dollar index). 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
                                                          
15 Similarly, we can represent the cost advantage or UIP deviation in euro funding using the three-month EURIBOR 
rate and NOK/EUR exchange rate. 
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In econometric terms, the examination of the effect of monetary policy on lending without 
considering the FX funding advantage—as in our baseline model—might lead to omitted variable 
bias. So, in a next set of regressions, we address this issue by re-estimating the model, now 
including deviation from UIP as an additional explanatory variable. We present this extended 
model version only for the period 2002-2017, since this is the time when substantial, persistent 
deviations of ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 from zero are observable and the domestic lending channel breaks down.  
With ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, stage two regression (previous model (2)) becomes: 
(5)  𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚2𝑚𝑚=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗6𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡  
in which ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚 denotes UIP deviation with 𝑚𝑚 quarter lags. This number of lags is again determined 
by the Akaike Information Criteria, which points to two quarters as the optimal number of lags to 
be considered in the estimation. Figure 1 illustrates the stationarity of ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, which has also been 
established for the other variables in equation (5) by earlier research, so we are not concerned 
about spurious effects in this time series model.  
As discussed earlier, Kashyap and Stein’s (2000) approach enables us to identify the supply 
side of bank funding costs in terms of domestic monetary policy. By expanding the second stage 
of their model to include UIP deviation (equation (5)), we are still identifying supply-side effects. 
However, when the second stage model includes UIP deviation, identification could be potentially 
threatened if a positive ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡  is generated by positive expectations about investment returns in 
Norway that simultaneously also affect the sensitivity of loan supply with respect to liquidity. In 
this case, the estimation of equation (5) may suggest that bank lending is less sensitive to ex ante 
liquidity endowment when UIP deviation is high. This relationship will not be driven by UIP 
deviation itself but rather by unobservable optimistic sentiment about the Norwegian economy, 
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which shifts up both the NOK exchange rate and loan supply. In our microeconometric setting, we 
achieve identification by focusing on the exogenous part of the UIP deviations, which we derive 
by using instruments based on exogenous components of exchange rate dynamics. More 
specifically, we instrument ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 by the dynamics of global risk as measured by the VIX index (Rey 
(2015) and the broad dollar index (Erik et al. (2020))16 by the dynamics of global risk aversion as 
measured by the spread of US bonds with BBB rating versus AAA-rated bonds and by global oil 
prices, as measured by the change in the Brent oil barrel price.  
Global risk indicators as instrumental variables 
Conceptually, the use of the global risk indicators as instrumental variables is motivated 
by the argument that capital inflows into periphery countries are strongly correlated with the 
volatility of global financial markets and the prevailing level of risk aversion (Rey (2015), 
Hofmann, Shim, and Shin (2016)). The VIX index used to drive global financial cycles and lower 
VIX implied higher leverage and credit expansion, as is shown in Bruno and Shin (2015a, b). 
However, recent evidence (Forbes and Warnock (2020), Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020)) 
shows that the negative relationship between the VIX and leverage has broken down since 2009, 
and after that, Erik et al. (2020) find that the explanatory power of the VIX for global financial 
cycles has been replaced by the broad dollar index. Indeed, we find that the VIX and the broad 
dollar index explain the UIP deviation in the NOK/USD exchange rate before and after 2009, 
respectively, through the following regression 
(6)  ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1GLOBAL_FACTOR𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  
                                                          
16 We are very grateful to the referee who suggested that we should explore the global risk factors. 
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in which ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 is the UIP deviation in the NOK/USD exchange rate. The vector GLOBAL_FACTOR𝑡𝑡 
includes the VIX or broad dollar, or both of them, and it also includes the BBB spread as a proxy 
detecting the shifts in risk aversion in order to strengthen identification and address the concern 
that the VIX and the broad dollar index alone might not be a perfect control for global risk. 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 is 
the error term.  
As the results in Table 3 suggest, for the period 2002-2017, a higher VIX leads to higher ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (columns 1 and 2). While capital inflows to periphery countries are often negatively correlated 
with global risk factors and risk aversion, Norway represents the flip side of this phenomenon 
owing to its strong institutions: The higher global risk, the higher the inflow of capital into the 
country. This effect was particularly reinforced during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis and 
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe in 2010-2012, as ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 in Figure 1 is particularly high.   
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
In the period 2002-2009, it is a higher VIX (see column 5), not a weaker dollar (that is the 
lower broad dollar index, see columns 4 and 6), that drives the rise in ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, while the situation is 
reversed after 2009. In the period 2010-2017, the weaker dollar explains the higher ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (see columns 
7 and 9), and the effect of the VIX is reduced (column 8) compared to the period 2002-2009 
(column 5). These findings are closely in line with recent evidence that the broad dollar takes over 
the role of the VIX in driving global financial flows. With regard to the broad dollar index as a 
risk measure, the relation between exchange rate dynamics in Norway and the broad dollar index 
is the same as the one identified globally by Erik et al. (2020), i.e., a strong US dollar generally 
suggests capital outflows and lower cost advantages of funding in foreign currency. The 
divergence in the direction of VIX’s versus the broad dollar index’s impact for the post-crisis 
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period is also consistent with the arguments of Erik et al. (2020). In the rest of this paper, based 
on these findings and evidence from recent literature, we will use the VIX index and broad dollar 
index as instruments for UIP deviation for the periods 2002-2009 and 2010-2017, respectively. 
Oil price as instrumental variable 
We also explore the oil price as a valid instrument for ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 since, on the one hand, observable 
spot NOK exchange rates strongly co-move with the oil price (given that the oil sector accounts 
for more than one-fourth of Norwegian GDP). On the other hand, because of the relatively small 
size of local oil reserves and the economy as a whole, Norway-specific factors are not sufficient 
to affect world oil prices, so the exogeneity of the oil price with respect to exchange rate dynamics 
and thus with respect to ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡  is guaranteed. However, given the importance of oil for aggregate 
macroeconomic dynamics in Norway, there is a threat to the validity of the exclusion condition of 
oil price as an instrument. The oil price might affect bank lending not only via its impact on ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, 
but can also directly affect the volume of bank lending through credit supply to the oil industry 
and to industries with strong links to the oil sector. That is why, in the rest of this section, we 
explore both specifications that use the oil price as an additional instrument and specifications that 
do not include the oil price in the vector of instrumental variables. 
The choice of instruments passes standard tests: Their strength is confirmed by an F-test 
statistic of the first-stage regression of roughly 20, while the exogeneity is formally confirmed by 
a Hansen overidentification test. The results of the first stage regressions reported in Table B.1, 
Appendix B suggest, consistently with the estimation illustrated in Table 3, that while the VIX has 
a positive impact on ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 for the whole period 2002-2017 and the period 2002-2009, the broad dollar 
index has a negative impact on ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, which is strongly significant in the period 2010-2017.  
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In Table 4, we report the results of estimating the modified two-step model using equation 
(5) as the second-step regression, which includes the lagged UIP deviation ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡  as another 
independent variable, with ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 being proxied by different sets of instrumental variables for different 
time horizons. In Panel A and Panel B, we report the results with the VIX and broad dollar as 
instruments, respectively, over the whole period 2002-2017. We also report results within each 
panel with and without the oil price as an instrument.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
The coefficients presented in both panels signal two essential results. First, under all 
settings, the negative and statistically strongly significant sums of the coefficients of ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡  lags,  ∑𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚, point to the existence of a global funding channel: Norwegian banks are less sensitive to 
their liquidity position when expanding lending volumes if the cost advantage of foreign currency 
funding is high, that is, when they face favorable global funding conditions. 
Second, the lagged interest rates enter the regression with a positive statistically significant 
sum of coefficients, ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗, when the VIX is used as instrument, while the significance is slightly 
weaker when the broad dollar is used instead. This result is illustrative of the fact that once we 
control for the effect of global factors, we find evidence of the validity of the bank lending channel. 
In other words, as presumed, the failure to document bank lending channel effects in the models 
presented in Table 2 could be attributed to an omitted variable bias stemming from ignoring global 
factors. This result also implies that the VIX drives financial inflows to Norway both before 2009 
(especially during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis) and after 2009 (especially during the 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe in 2010-2012), while consistent with Erik et al. (2020), the role of 
the broad dollar in driving global financial flows mostly emerges after 2009.  
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To test the emerging role of the broad dollar after 2009, in Panel C, we report the results 
based on the VIX and broad dollar as instruments for the periods 2002-2009 and 2010-2017, 
respectively. In both sub-panels, negative and significant ∑𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚 confirms that cheaper FX funding 
eases banks’ funding conditions and makes them less sensitive to domestic monetary policy, and 
the bank lending channel is restored with positive and significant ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗. Results in both sub-panels 
are quantitatively similar, and significance indeed emerges in the period of 2010-2017 with the 
broad dollar used as instrument. These results, together with the results of the estimation of the 
first stage regression presented in Table B.1, Appendix B, suggest that the VIX and the broad 
dollar index are valid instruments for the periods 2002-2009 and 2010-2017, respectively. 
Therefore, for the sake of economy in the rest of the paper, we will mostly report only 
specifications using the VIX for the period 2002-2009 and the broad dollar index for the period 
2010-2017. 
Taken together, the results in Table 4 suggest that global financial risk factors generate UIP 
deviations with respect to the Norwegian krone, and these UIP deviations are associated with a 
comparative cost advantage of FX funding. That is, in times of increasing global risks with a higher 
VIX, the safe-haven status of Norway results in an implicit negative risk premium on investments 
in Norwegian institutions. The drop in FX funding costs eases banks’ funding constraints and thus 
modifies the effectiveness of monetary policy. For the later time period, the attractiveness of dollar 
funding is related to the broad dollar index and still significantly affects domestic lending: in times 
of declining global risk with a weakening dollar, the appreciation in the Norwegian krone with 
positive UIP deviation also makes dollar funding attractive and relaxes banks’ lending constraints.   
Next, we address the potential asymmetry of the impact of global funding conditions. For 
this purpose, we explore whether our results change when banks face more favorable (∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 > 0) or 
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less favorable (∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 < 0) FX funding conditions. In Table 5, we report the results with the VIX as 
instrument for the period 2002-2009, and the results with the broad dollar as instrument for the 
period 2010-2017. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
As shown, global funding channel and domestic monetary policy jointly drive bank lending, 
as we have documented, even when FX funding becomes less favorable (∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 < 0). This is because 
when banks are locked in FX funding, they cannot perfectly replace it with domestic funding when 
the cost advantage of FX funding declines. However, the table also shows that after 2009, bank 
lending is more sensitive (higher ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗) to monetary policy when ∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 < 0, implying that banks do 
shift from FX funding to domestic funding, which is sensitive to monetary policy.17 
C. Currency Hedging, Deviations from CIP, and Global Funding Supply 
In sum, the evidence presented in the previous section underlines the cost advantage of FX 
funding as an important determinant of Norwegian bank lending. The economic and the statistical 
                                                          
17 In unreported tests, we also explore whether our results are driven by the sign or level of ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, by replacing ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 with a 
dummy variable that equals 1 for ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 > 0 and 0 otherwise. The results of this test are qualitatively the same as those in 
Table 5, suggesting that controlling for the sign of the cost advantage, ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, alone is sufficient to both document a 
significant impact of the cost advantage and restore the effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. In unreported tests 
we provide some further evidence of how the tightening (or loosening) of domestic and global funding conditions 
interact. These tests are based on dividing our dataset into four subsamples, representing the four possible scenarios 
of loosening and tightening domestic monetary policy, each combined with rising and declining cost advantages of 
foreign currency funding. They show that a loosening of domestic monetary policy boosts lending in times of 
tightening global conditions. Consistent with the results of Table 5, these tests also indicate that banks can insulate 
themselves from the tightening of domestic monetary policy when global funding conditions become more favorable. 
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significance of the cost advantage might be surprising at a first glance, given the fact that 
Norwegian regulations require banks to hedge some of their foreign currency exposure by means 
of swap or forward contracts (as stipulated by Chapter IV of Act No. 40 of 10 June 1988 (Financial 
Institutions Act) for all financial institutions, as well as Regulation No. 550 of 25 May 2007 for 
mortgage companies, see Molland (2014)). In practice, banks need to exchange foreign currencies 
for NOK after they borrow in foreign currencies, and they need to make sure that sufficient foreign 
currencies are available when loans mature. Typically, banks enter foreign currency swaps if the 
funding is short-term or cross-currency basis swaps if the funding is long-term. 
However, in reality, spot transactions still account for around 34% of total FX turnover in 
NOK as of 2016, and spot turnover is highest in USD (Norges Bank (2018)), so that the cost 
advantage of FX funding in terms of UIP deviations does matter for banks. And even if foreign 
currency liabilities are hedged, such deviations can still be relevant to banks’ funding costs. As 
already mentioned, this is the case on the one hand, since the UIP deviations reflect a shift in the 
supply of international funds to Norway, which then shifts Norwegian banks’ funding costs. On 
the other hand, even if positions are hedged at the maturity of the liabilities’ contracts, the maturity 
mismatch between assets and liabilities generates a liquidity risk in that a bank must roll over the 
foreign currency liability to match the maturity of the assets. The conditions under which the 
corresponding liabilities roll over will depend on exchange rate dynamics, no matter whether the 
initial foreign currency exposure is hedged or not. Further, as shown by Bräuning and Ivashina 
(2020), the inflow of a substantial amount of capital into a country and the corresponding need for 
hedging the exchange rate positions shift the demand-supply equilibrium in the markets for 
hedging instruments, thus also affecting the cost of the hedge. 
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Taking this debate further, we also find that global factors matter for bank lending even if 
we focus on completely hedged positions. More specifically, we follow the approach of Hofmann 
et al. (2016) in analyzing the risk-shifting effects of currency appreciation and focus on exploring 
how the cost advantage generated by hedged FX positions, measured by the deviation from 
covered interest rate parity (CIP), affects the effectiveness of the lending channel. To this end, we 
construct the local currency risk-spread measure proposed by Du and Schreger (2016) as a proxy 
for the deviations from CIP. This measure is defined as the spread of local currency (in our case 
NOK) 3-month government bond yields achievable by a dollar-based investor over yields on US 
Treasury securities with the same maturity. While CIP deviations cannot be identified using the 
NIBOR/LIBOR differential since the NIBOR rate is by definition quoted as the LIBOR rate plus 
the forward premium, the Du-Schreger measure, which is government bond yield-based, does 
identify non-negligible deviations from CIP, reflecting the cost advantage of FX funding with 
hedging.  
In order to explore the role of global factors on the hedged banks’ foreign currency 
positions, we rerun the regression specifications using the Du-Schreger measure of the cost 
advantage, or CIP deviation ?̃?𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 instead of ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, i.e., the second step is specified as 
(7)  𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑛𝑛?̃?𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡−𝑛𝑛2𝑛𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗6𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 
Again, we improve the identification by controlling for the fact that both the Du-Schreger 
measure and bank lending might be driven by unobservable characteristics of the state of the 
Norwegian economy. To this end, as before, we use the VIX index and the broad dollar index as 
instruments for the Du-Schreger measure.  
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The results of the estimations are presented in Table 6, which contains four columns. The 
results reported in the first two columns reflect the estimation results with the VIX and the broad 
dollar as instruments, respectively, and the period covered in the estimation is 2002-2017. In the 
third and fourth columns, we report the results of specifications with the VIX and the broad dollar 
as instruments, over the periods 2002-2009 and 2010-2017, respectively. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
For the entire time horizon, when ?̃?𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 is instrumented by the VIX as column 1 shows, the 
result is again consistent with a strong role for global factors in shaping domestic Norwegian 
lending: Even when we control for the hedging of foreign currency positions, the ?̃?𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡  is still 
significantly related to Norwegian banks’ ability to insulate themselves from domestic monetary 
policy shocks. This provides the micro-level evidence for Avdjiev et al. (2019), who find on a 
macro level that global risk factors are associated with CIP deviations that drive cross-border 
financial flows. Furthermore, although the power of the broad dollar index as instrument is weak 
over the entire time horizon 2002-2017 (as column 2 shows), it does result in joint significance for 
global funding and monetary policy for the period 2010-2017 as column 4 shows; this is again in 
line with recent evidence (Erik et al. (2020)) that the broad dollar index emerges as a driver of 
global financial flows after 2009. Overall, our results imply that even when banks hedge their FX 
positions, short-term CIP deviations, ?̃?𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 , that are derived from short-term interest rate 
differentials still signal particularly strong opportunities for banks to insulate themselves from 
domestic monetary policy at times when favorable CIP differentials exist—even in the short run. 




After establishing how the global funding channel affects the volume of bank lending when 
interest rate differentials are not neutralized by exchange rate dynamics, in this section, we dig 
deeper and explore how global funding conditions affect the currency decomposition of bank 
assets and liabilities as well as banks’ risk-taking, which we proxy by the shifts in loan portfolios.   
Our analysis starts in Section IV.A, where we explore whether banks utilize the cost 
advantage for foreign currency funding and increase the share of funding denominated in foreign 
currency with rising UIP deviations. Next, in Section IV.B, we examine how the cost advantage 
for foreign currency funding affects bank leverage and the composition of bank asset portfolios in 
terms of different types of loans. To this end we lean on the argument, pioneered by Bruno and 
Shin (2015a), that cross-border financial flows via global banks can affect bank risk-taking. In 
Bruno and Shin’s setup, global banks borrow from international money markets and issue foreign 
currency-denominated loans to domestic firms. When the domestic currency appreciates, firms’ 
net worth increases, due to the currency mismatch on their balance sheet. This results in a general 
reduction of credit risk that brings down banks’ value-at-risk and allows banks to increase their 
leverage by expanding lending, also to borrowers that would have otherwise been considered as 
being too risky. Currency appreciation, therefore, increases banks’ risk-taking. Using aggregate 
level data, Bruno and Shin (2015a, b) present empirical support for this argument.  
We provide the first micro-level test for Bruno and Shin (2015a), using our bank-level data. 
As already discussed, our empirical set up is slightly different, since in Norway the currency 
mismatch is mostly observed within banks (rather than firms) that have access to foreign currency 
funding from international money markets but issue loans mostly in NOK. Also, while in Bruno 
and Shin (2015a) firms completely rely on foreign currency loans, banks in Norway can choose 
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between international foreign currency funding and domestic NOK funding. If a bank raises FX 
funding, say, from the spot market, its funding cost is 
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 (1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗), 
given the spot NOK/USD exchange rate 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 and foreign interest rate 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗; if the bank raises NOK 
funding from the domestic money market instead, its funding cost is 1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 , with 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡  being the 
domestic interest rate. An appreciation of the local currency (in our case the NOK) that is not 
related to monetary policy rate differentials will, therefore, be reflected in an increase in the cost 
advantage ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 of FX over domestic funding, which is given by 
(8)  ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 1+𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡1+𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ − 1 
and corresponds exactly to the UIP deviation defined in equation (3). 18  
To pin down the international risk-taking channel for banks à la Bruno and Shin (2015a), 
we therefore use our measure for global funding conditions , ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, as a “currency appreciation” 
measure for banks.   
A. Global Funding Condition and FX Liabilities 
                                                          
18 We rearrange equation (8) as 1 + ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1 1+𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡1+𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ and take logarithm on both sides to get −?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡+1−𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + (𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡∗ − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡). 




First, we examine how the dynamics of the cost advantage of foreign currency funding 
affect banks’ use of foreign currency liabilities. For this purpose, we estimate the following model:  
(9) FX_LIABILITIES𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜂𝜂𝑛𝑛?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡−𝑛𝑛1𝑛𝑛=0 + ∑ 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗1𝑗𝑗=0 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡CONTROLS𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , 
in which the share of foreign currency funding in banks’ total assets (FX_LIABILITIES𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡)  is 
regressed on (lagged) UIP deviation ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, (lagged) monetary policy rate 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡. As suggested by AIC, 
the number of lags for both ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 is set at 2. We also include a set of lagged bank- and macro-
level control variables, CONTROLS𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1, which consists of bank’s total assets, deposit and loan 
growth rate, the GDP growth rate and the growth rate of house prices. To control for unobservable 
and persistent factors affecting the use of foreign currency funding, we estimate the model using 
bank-level fixed effects 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖. As in Section III, we address the potential endogeneity of the cost 
advantage of foreign currency funding via instrumenting ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡  by the VIX index and the BBB spread 
for the period 2002-2009 and by the broad dollar index and the BBB spread for the period 2010-
2017. 
Results are reported in Table 7, in which we show how banks react in FX funding, when 
global funding conditions improve (∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 > 0) or deteriorate (∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 < 0). We report the results with ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡  instrumented by the VIX and the broad dollar for the periods 2002-2009 and 2010-2017, 
respectively. We find that banks increase FX liabilities when global funding conditions improve 
(∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 > 0, as columns 1 and 3 show), while they do not necessarily reduce FX exposure in funding 
liabilities when global funding conditions deteriorate (∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 < 0, see columns 2 and 4). This result 
suggests that foreign exchange positions are not reversed promptly by Norwegian banks when 
favorable foreign funding conditions are reversed. Banks can, therefore, be vulnerable to the 
hazards of forced deleveraging implied by the international risk-taking channel à la Bruno and 
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Shin (2015a) when a previously appreciating currency starts to depreciate, given that bank leverage 
and risk have been built up during currency appreciation. The strength of a bank’s balance sheet 
is therefore contingent on whether or not favorable exchange rate dynamics persist or not. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
B. Portfolio Adjustments and Risk-Taking 
As mentioned above, in this subsection we focus on a microeconometric (bank-level) test 
of the international risk-taking channel of currency appreciation. More specifically, we trace the 
relationship between bank portfolio composition, various measures of portfolio risk,  bank 
leverage and global funding conditions, proxied by ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡. For this purpose, we estimate the following 
modified version of model (9): 
(10)  BANK_PORTFOLIO𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + ∑ 𝜂𝜂𝑛𝑛?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡−𝑛𝑛2𝑛𝑛=1 + ∑ 𝜁𝜁𝑗𝑗𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗2𝑗𝑗=1 + 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡CONTROLS𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
where BANK_PORTFOLIO𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 represents a set of dependent variables related to bank asset portfolios, 
leverage and risk, such as the share of loans denominated in foreign currency (FX_LOANS), of 
commercial and industrial loans (C&I_LOANS) and of mortgage loans (MORTGAGE_LOANS) 
in total loan volumes, the ratio of common equity to total assets (LEVERAGE) as well as risk 
measures such as the share of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL), the ratio of loan loss 
provisions to total assets (LLP) and the z-score of the bank (ZSCORE).19 The main explanatory 
variables ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡, the set of control and instrumental variables, and the estimation method are 
                                                          




identical to the ones in model (9). The only difference is that we take one and two legs of ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡  rather than one lag and the simultaneous value to account for the time needed for funding 
conditions to be reflected in bank portfolio decisions. In unreported tests, we confirm the 
robustness of the results when the simultaneous and one lag values are used. 
In Panel A of Table 8, we report the results for the period 2002-2009 with the VIX index 
and BBB spread as instruments, and in Panel B we report the results for the period 2010-2017 with 
the broad dollar index and BBB spread as instruments. Column 1 of both panels indicates that a 
drop in the cost of foreign currency funding does not increase the share of loans that banks grant 
to customers in foreign currencies, suggesting that banks face most of the benefits and risks 
stemming from a currency mismatch. In Section III, we have already shown that banks’ lending 
volumes increase when global funding conditions become favorable. Columns 2 and 3 of both 
panels in Table 8 further suggest that, under favorable FX funding conditions, banks over 
proportionally expand riskier C&I loans relative to less risky mortgage loans, implying that banks 
are taking more risks in their lending. This indication is further confirmed by the results illustrated 
in columns 4 and 5 of both panels, which signal that not only the perceived riskiness of the loans 
as measured by LLP is increasing, but also the realized loan risk as measured by NPL goes up 
when global funding conditions are more favorable. Consistent with Bruno and Shin (2015a), these 
results indicate that the confidence associated with favorable funding conditions encourages banks 
to undertake additional risks when expanding loans. This mirrors similar results for domestic 
funding conditions (e.g. Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina (2014)). Since banks exploiting 
favorable global funding conditions tend to increase (risky) lending, they not only increase their 
leverage (see column 6) but also suffer a deterioration of the general bank’s risk level as measured 
by the z-score (column 7). In other words, a higher cost advantage from foreign currency funding 
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has the potential to increase bank margins and thus strengthen bank balance sheets, but it also 
pushes bank lending to the edge of capital capacity, so that no improvement in bank capitalization 
is observed. Our results thus support the international risk-taking channel of currency appreciation 
in Bruno and Shin (2015a, b): NOK appreciation that is not neutralized by domestic monetary 
policy allows banks to increase leverage and risk-taking. The results are also consistent with 
Adrian and Shin (2014), who argue that banks actively manage their balance sheets to maintain 
value-at-risk at no more than available equity. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
V. Robustness Checks 
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks for the previous results. First, as 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) argue, there is little consensus on the measurement of 
monetary policy shocks. Here we do not attempt to propose one perfect measurement, but rather 
we take two alternative monetary policy indicators that are typically used in the literature to replace 
the one in regression (2): (i) the key policy rate; (ii) changes in three-month NIBOR. 
Next, in order to quantify the stance of monetary policy in the US when the target federal 
funds rate was around the zero lower bound between December 2008 and December 2015, we also 
control for the changes in the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy stance using the Wu-Xia shadow 
rate (Wu and Xia (2016)) to proxy the US monetary policy rate. And last but not least, we show 
that the results are robust to using UIP deviation, or the cost advantage of EUR funding rather than 
USD funding. This is to address the concern that a substantial share of foreign currency funding 
might be denominated in EUR rather than in USD. 
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The results of all the robustness specifications are reported in Table 9. In Panel A/Panel B, 
we report results based on using the VIX/broad dollar as instrument for the entire period 2002-
2017, and in Panel C/Panel D, we report results based on using the VIX/broad dollar as instrument 
for the period 2002-2009/2010-2017. Our results are robust to monetary policy measures (columns 
1 and 2 of all panels): Under each of the settings, improved FX funding conditions reduces the 
sensitivity of bank lending to liquidity (∑𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚 < 0), and tightening domestic monetary policy 
increases the sensitivity of bank lending to liquidity (∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 > 0). Our results are also robust to using 
an alternative measure of US monetary policy as well as UIP deviation, or the cost advantage of 
EUR funding, within the period 2002-2009/2010-2017 when the VIX/broad dollar prevails as 
global risk factor, as columns 3 and 4 in Panel C/Panel D show. Overall, the results here are 
consistent with those reported in Table 4. 
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we provide the first micro-level evidence on how banks’ global funding limits 
the bank lending channel of domestic monetary policy transmission in a small open economy, as 
well as how such global financial flows modify banks’ balance sheets and affect their risk-taking 
behavior. Using Norwegian data, we show that global funding conditions dampen the effectiveness 
of domestic monetary policy: Exchange rate dynamics that do not fully neutralize the interest rate 
differentials generate favorable global funding conditions for Norwegian banks, raise their 
incentives to use foreign currency funding and insulate banks from domestic monetary policy 
tightening. These favorable global funding conditions improve bank liquidity, allowing banks to 
adjust their balance sheets by increasing leverage and taking on more credit risk.   
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These results support the existence of a risk-taking channel of currency appreciation 
(Bruno and Shin (2015a, b)) and raise concerns about the challenges to conducting monetary policy 
in small open economies. The concerns are especially valid in the case when central banks try to 
limit risks that are associated with lending booms and that pose a threat to financial stability by 
adopting the “lean-against-the-wind” type of monetary policy. In principle, raising funding costs 
in domestic money markets by tightening monetary policy is desirable in order to contain domestic 
credit booms. However, as we show in our paper, it may also make it comparatively more favorable 
for banks to raise funding in international money markets to avoid the adverse impact of domestic 
monetary policy on their lending, and this may even increase their risk-taking. To maintain the 
effectiveness of domestic monetary policy and contain banks’ risk-taking encouraged by global 
funding flows, one potential solution is to design complementary macroprudential policies that 








A. The intermediate estimates of 𝜷𝜷𝒕𝒕 
In Figure A1, we present the time series of 𝛽𝛽𝑡𝑡 that is estimated from the first step regression 
of our model, as described in equation (1). 
[INSERT FIGURE A1 HERE] 
 
B. The first-stage regression results of the instrumental variable estimation whose second 
stage results are presented in Table 4 
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Figure 1: Cost Advantage of Dollar Funding Measured by Deviation from UIP, ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, 1994-2017 


















































































Table 1: Variable Definition and Summary Statistics 
In this table, we report the variable definitions as well as the number of observations, the mean and the median values, the standard 
deviation and the 1st and the 99th percentile for each of the variables employed in the analysis. 
  N Mean Median Std. Dev. 1 Pctile 99 Pctile 
Panel A: Bank-level variables  
LOAN_GROWTH Log growth rate of total loans and 
leases between quarter 𝑡𝑡 and 
quarter 𝑡𝑡 − 1  
14,706 0.028 0.022 0.200 -0.141 0.356 
LIQUID_ASSETS_TO_ASSETS Ratio of liquid assets to total assets 14,706 0.107 0.084 0.105 0.005 0.575 
CAPITALIZATION Ratio of total shareholders’ equity 
to total assets 
14,221 0.060 0.053 0.093 0.002 0.194 
DEPOSIT_GROWTH Log growth rate of total deposits 
between quarter 𝑡𝑡 and quarter 𝑡𝑡 −
1 
14,289 0.027 0.017 0.185 -0.164 0.375 
DEPOSITS Ratio of total deposits to total 
assets 
14,954 0.666 0.704 0.191 0.001 0.909 
WRITE_OFFS Ratio of total write-offs to total 
assets (write-offs enter the 
ORBOF report with a negative 
sign) 
14,242 -0.007 -0.004 0.010 -0.037 -0.000 
FOREIGN_CURRENCY_LIABILITIES Ratio of liabilities denominated in 
foreign currency to total liabilities 
14,242 0.028 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.542 
FOREIGN_CURRENCY_LOANS Ratio of loans denominated in 
foreign currency to total loans 
14,390 0.024 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.519 
C&I_LOANS Ratio of C&I loans to total loans 
and leases 
14,997 0.247 0.246 0.077 0.000 0.549 
MORTGAGE_LOANS Ratio of mortgage loans to total 
loans and leases  
13,663 0.607 0.638 0.183 0.010 0.986 
SIZE Logarithm of total assets (in 
thousands of NOK) adjusted for 
CPI 
15,041 14.449 14.179 1.633 10.849 19.132 
NON_PERFORMING_LOANS Ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans and leases 
13,645 0.020 0.013 0.026 0.000 0.109 
LOAN_LOSS_PROVISIONS Ratio of loan loss provisions to 
total loans and leases 
13,455 0.001 0.000 0.008 -0.002 0.016 
ZSCORE Sum of a bank’s return on assets 
(ROA) and equity ratio, 
normalized by standard deviation 
of ROA 
14,194 13.191 12.030 10.002 0.374 38.669 
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Panel B: Interest rates and international finance controls 
KEY_POLICY_RATE Interest rate paid by the Norges 
Bank on commercial bank reserves 
15,041 3.543 3.316 2.182 0.500 8.450 
NIBOR Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate 
with 3-month maturity 
15,041 3.997 3.517 2.213 0.808 9.569 
COST_ADVANTAGE  Тhe cost advantage of FX funding, 
defined in equation (3)  
15,041 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.006 0.013 
OIL_PRICE Change in barrel price of Brent oil 
in USD 
15,041 0.633 1.066 9.245 -59.716 25.803 
VIX VIX index as published at FRED 
(St. Louis Fed)  
15,041 19.659 18.204 7.547 10.308 58.595 
BBB_BOND SPREAD Spread between the yield of BBB- 
and AAA-rated bonds as published 
at FRED (St. Louis Fed) 
15,041 2.041 1.907 1.079 0.743 7.030 
BROAD_DOLLAR_INDEX Dollar exchange rate index against 
a broad currency index as 
published at FRED (St. Louis Fed) 
15,041 110.194 110.941 10.199 90.240 129.025 
Panel C: Macroeconomic controls 
GDP_GROWTH Annualized growth rate of GDP 
(quarterly data) in % 
15,041 2.625 2.505 2.255 -1.623 9.126 
HOUSE_PRICE_GROWTH Annual growth rate of house prices 
(per sqm) 





Table 2: Lending Channel in Norway 1994-2017 
In this table, we report the estimates of the regression for the sensitivity of bank loan growth to bank liquidity (𝛽𝛽) on monetary 
policy interest rates, which are measured by the NIBOR (Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate). Column 1 presents the result for the 
whole period of 1994-2017, column 2 presents the result for the period of 1994-2001, and columns 3-5 present the results for the 
period of 2002-2017. Among the results for the period of 2002-2017, column 3 reports the result for the whole subsample, while 
columns 4 and 5 report the results for periods with tightening monetary policy (∆𝑟𝑟 > 0) and loosening monetary policy (∆𝑟𝑟 < 0), 
respectively. The reported figures in the columns are from the sum of the estimated coefficients on the six lags of each monetary 
policy rate. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 1994-2017 1994-2001  2002-2017  
 All ∆𝑟𝑟 > 0 ∆𝑟𝑟 < 0 
 1 2 3 4 5 










No. of obs. 13,928 4,571 9,357 4,438 4,919 





Table 3: Global Risk Factors and UIP Deviation post-2001 
In this table, we report the results of time series regressions for the determinants of the cost advantage, ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, measured by UIP deviation, following equation (6). Columns 1-3 report 
the results for the full period 2002-2017, columns 4-6 report the results for the period 2002-2009, and columns 7-9 report the results for the period 2010-2017. In each group of 
results, GLOBAL_FACTOR𝑡𝑡 includes BBB spread, plus the VIX or broad dollar, or both of them. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 2002-2017 2002-2009 2010-2017 
 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
VIX 0.035*** 0.034***  0.039 0.051**  0.021*** 0.032***  
 (0.012) (0.012)  (0.024) (0.022)  (0.005) (0.011)  
Broad dollar -0.004  -0.003 0.013  0.020* -0.018***  -0.019*** 
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.011)  (0.010) (0.001)  (0.002) 
BBB spread -0.049 -0.040 0.175*** -0.054 -0.133 0.190*** -0.084 -0.040 0.104** 
 (0.090) (0.089) (0.043) (0.160) (0.145) (0.055) (0.055) (0.136) (0.048) 
Constant 0.164 -0.271** 0.190 -1.831 -0.509** -2.363** 2.061*** -0.139 2.176*** 
 (0.568) (0.119) (0.599) (1.157) (0.220) (1.140) (0.197) (0.184) (0.256) 





Table 4: Monetary Policy and Global Factors post-2001 
In this table, we report the estimates of the regression for the sensitivity of bank loan growth to bank liquidity (𝛽𝛽) on the NIBOR 
as a proxy for the key policy rate and UIP deviation, ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡. The panels report the main results of the second stage regression, where ∑𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚 represents the sum of coefficients of the two lags of UIP deviation, while ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗  represents the sum of coefficients of the six 
lags of the NIBOR, when ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡is instrumented via the oil price, the VIX/broad dollar and the BBB spread. In Panel A, we report the 
results with  ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the VIX for the whole period 2002-2017: Panel A.1 with ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the oil price, the VIX, 
and the BBB spread, and Panel A.2 with ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the VIX and the BBB spread. In Panel B, we report the results with  ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the broad dollar for the whole period 2002-2017: Panel B.1 with ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the oil price, the broad 
dollar, and the BBB spread, and Panel B.2 with ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the broad dollar and the BBB spread. In Panel C, we report the 
results with  ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the VIX/broad dollar for the periods 2002-2009 and 2010-2017: Panel C.1 with ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented 
by the VIX and the BBB spread for the period 2002-2009, and Panel C.2 with ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the broad dollar and the BBB 
spread for the period 2010-2017. 𝑅𝑅2 is not reported for the instrumental variable regression because no decomposition of the 
variance of the dependent variable can be assigned to the endogenous dependent variables. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A Using the VIX as instrument, 2002-2017 






Number of observations 9,357 






Number of observations 9,357 
Panel B Using the broad dollar as instrument, 2002-2017 






Number of observations 9,357 






Number of observations 9,357 
Panel C: Using the VIX/broad dollar as instrument for the period 2002-2009/2010-2017 





Number of observations 4,768 











Table 5: Asymmetric Reaction to Favorable and Unfavorable Exchange Rate Dynamics  
In this table, we report the estimates of the regression for the sensitivity of bank loan growth to bank liquidity (𝛽𝛽) on the NIBOR 
as a proxy for the monetary policy interest rate and the cost advantage of FX funding, ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, which is instrumented by the VIX (for 
the period 2002-2009, columns 1 and 2), the broad dollar (for the period 2010-2017, columns 3 and 4) and the BBB spread for 
periods with positive and with negative changes of ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡. ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 represents the sum of the six lags of the NIBOR, while ∑𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚 represents 
the sum of the coefficients of two lags of the ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 . 𝑅𝑅2  is not reported for the instrumental variable regression because no 
decomposition of the variance of the dependent variable can be assigned to the endogenous dependent variables. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 2002-2009 (IV: VIX and BBB spread) 2010-2017 (IV: Broad dollar and BBB spread) 
 ∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 > 0 ∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 < 0 ∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 > 0 ∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 < 0 






















Table 6: Du-Schreger’s Local Currency Risk Measure and the Lending Channel 
In this table, we report the estimates of the regression for the sensitivity of bank loan growth to bank liquidity (𝛽𝛽) on the NIBOR 
as a proxy for the monetary policy interest rate and the cost advantage of FX funding with hedging, ?̃?𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡, approximated by the Du-
Schreger measure (the spread of 3-month Norwegian government bond yields achievable by a dollar-based investor over yields on 
US Treasury securities with the same maturity), instrumented by the VIX/broad dollar and BBB spread. ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗  represents the sum of 
the six lags of the NIBOR, while ∑𝛿𝛿𝑛𝑛 represents the sum of the two lags of ?̃?𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡. In columns 1 and 2, we report the results with  ?̃?𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the VIX and the broad dollar for the whole period 2002-2017, respectively. In columns 3 and 4, we report 
the results with  ?̃?𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆,𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the VIX and the broad dollar for the periods 2002-2009 and 2010-2017, respectively.  𝑅𝑅2 is 
not reported for the instrumental variable regression because no decomposition of the variance of the dependent variable can be 
assigned to the endogenous dependent variables. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 2002-2017 (IV: VIX 
and BBB spread) 
2002-2017 (IV: Broad 
dollar and BBB 
spread) 
2002-2009 (IV: VIX 
and BBB spread) 
2010-2017 (IV: Broad 
dollar and BBB 
spread) 




























Table 7: The Response of Total Foreign Currency Funding to UIP Deviation 
In this table, we report the estimates of the regression for the share of total foreign currency funding at the bank level on 
simultaneous and lagged ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, as in equation (9) using both simultaneous and ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 with one lag, as well as domestic interest rates and 
bank- and macro-level variables as controls. We report the results for periods with increasing ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (columns 1 and 3) and decreasing ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (columns 2 and 4). ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 is instrumented by the BBB spread, together with the VIX and the broad dollar for the period 2002-2009 
(columns 1 and 2) and the period 010-2017 (columns 3 and 4), respectively. 𝑅𝑅2 is not reported for the instrumental variable 
regression because no decomposition of the variance of the dependent variable can be assigned to the endogenous dependent 
variables.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 2002-2009 (IV: VIX and BBB spread) 2010-2017 (IV: Broad dollar and BBB spread) 
 ∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 > 0 ∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 < 0 ∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 > 0 ∆?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 < 0 














Table 8: Global Funding and International Risk-Taking 
In this table, we report the estimates of the regressions for a set of variables measuring the composition of bank asset portfolio and bank risk on lagged ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡, as well as domestic interest 
rates and bank- and macro-level variables as controls. In Panel A, we report the results for the period 2002-2009 using the BBB spread together with the VIX as instruments for ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡. 
In Panel B, we report the results for the period 2010-2017, using the BBB spread together with the broad dollar index as instruments for ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡. 𝑅𝑅2 is not reported for the instrumental 
variable regression because no decomposition of the variance of the dependent variable can be assigned to the endogenous dependent variables.  *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: 2002-2009 (IV: VIX and BBB spread) 




























No. of obs. 4,480 4,429 4,428 4,445 4,430 4,480 4,480 
Panel B: 2010-2017 (IV: Broad dollar and BBB spread) 




























No. of obs. 4,079 3,974 3,925 3,929 4,002 4,020 4,020 
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Table 9: Robustness Checks  
In this table, we report the estimates of the regression for the sensitivity of bank loan growth to bank liquidity (𝛽𝛽) on monetary 
policy rate and UIP deviation, ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡. The panels report the main results of the second stage regression, where ∑𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚 represents the sum 
of coefficients of the two lags of UIP deviation, while ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 represents the sum of coefficients of the six lags of the NIBOR, with ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 
instrumented via the oil price, the VIX/broad dollar and the BBB spread. In Panel A, we report the results with  ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by 
the VIX for the entire period 2002-2017. In Panel B, we report the results with  ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the broad dollar index for the 
entire period 2002-2017. In Panel C, we report the results with  ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the VIX for the period 2002-2009. In Panel D, 
we report the results with  ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 instrumented by the broad dollar for the period of 2010-2017. In each of the panels, column 1/2 reports 
the results with Norges Bank’s key policy rate/changes in NIBOR used as proxy for the monetary policy rate in equation (2), 
column 3 reports the results with the Wu-Xia shadow rate used to proxy the US monetary policy rate in computing UIP deviation, 
and column 4 reports the results with UIP deviation in the NOK/EUR exchange rate used in equation (2). 𝑅𝑅2 is not reported for the 
instrumental variable regression because no decomposition of the variance of the dependent variable can be assigned to the 
endogenous dependent variables. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A Using VIX and BBB spread as instruments, 2002-2017 
 
Key policy rate Change in NIBOR ZLB (Wu-Xia shadow 
rate) 
Cost advantage c�t  of 
EUR funding 

















No. of obs. 9,357 9,357 9,357 9,357 
 
Panel B Using broad dollar and BBB spread as instruments, 2002-2017 
 
Key policy rate Change in NIBOR ZLB (Wu-Xia shadow 
rate) 
Cost advantage of 
EUR funding 



















No. of obs. 9,357 9,357 9,357 9,357 
 
Panel C Using VIX and BBB spread as instruments, 2002-2009 
 Key policy rate Change in NIBOR ZLB (Wu-Xia shadow 
rate) 
Cost advantage of 
EUR funding 
 

















No. of obs. 4,768 4,768 4,768 4,768 
 
Panel D Using broad dollar and BBB spread as instruments, 2010-2017 
 Key policy rate Change in NIBOR ZLB (Wu-Xia shadow 
rate) 
Cost advantage of 
EUR funding 
 

























Table B.1 First-Stage Regression Results for Table 4 
Panel A: In this panel, we present the first stage of the two-stage instrumental variable estimation 
presented in Panel A.2 of Table 4, i.e., the specification using the VIX and BBB spread as 
instrumental variables for the whole period 2002-2017. 
 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 − 1) ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 − 2) 
coefficient 𝑝𝑝-value coefficient 𝑝𝑝-value 
VIX     
L1. 0.010 0.000 0.014 0.000 
L2. 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000 
BBB Spread     
L1. -0.037 0.000 0.006 0.648 
L2. 0.092 0.000 0.018 0.118 
Constant -0.553 0.000 -0.494 0.000 
Number of obs.  9,357  9,357 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.55 0.56 
 
Panel B: In this panel, we present the first stage of the two-stage instrumental variable estimation 
presented in Panel B.2 of Table 4, i.e. the specification using the broad dollar index and BBB 
spread as instrumental variables the whole period 2002-2017. 
 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 − 1) ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 − 2) 
coefficient 𝑝𝑝-value coefficient 𝑝𝑝-value 
Broad Dollar     
L1. 0.018 0.000 0.020 0.000 
L2. -0.022 0.000 -0.019 0.000 
BBB Spread     
L1. -0.023 0.000 0.065 0.000 
L2. 0.141 0.000 0.046 0.000 
Constant -0.080 0.000 -0.311 0.000 
Number of obs.  9.357  9,357 




Panel C: In this panel, we present the first stage of the two-stage instrumental variable estimation 
presented in Panel C.1 of Table 4, i.e. the specification using the VIX and BBB spread as 
instrumental variables for the period 2002-2009. 
 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 − 1) ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 − 2) 
coefficient 𝑝𝑝-value coefficient 𝑝𝑝-value 
VIX     
L1. 0.010 0.000 0.010 0.000 
L2. 0.010 0.000 -0.007 0.000 
BBB Spread     
L1. 0.080 0.000 0.126 0.986 
L2. -0.009 0.159 0.018 0.003 
Constant 1.320 0.000 1.199 0.000 
Number of obs.  4,768  4,768 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.952 0.949 
 
Panel D: In this panel, we present the first stage of the two-stage instrumental variable estimation 
presented in Panel C.2 of Table 4, i.e. the specification using the broad dollar index and BBB 
spread as instrumental variables for the period of 2010-2017. 
 ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 − 1) ?̃?𝑐𝑡𝑡 (𝑡𝑡 − 2) 
coefficient 𝑝𝑝-value coefficient 𝑝𝑝-value 
Broad Dollar     
L1. 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 
L2. -0.015 0.000 -0.014 0.000 
BBB Spread     
L1. 0.011 0.000 0.091 0.000 
L2. 0.040 0.000 0.026 0.000 
Constant 1.452 0.000 1.072 0.000 
Number of obs.  4,589  4,589 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.951 0.964 
 
 
